Posts Tagged ‘embedded’

Trends in Embedded Software Design

Wednesday, April 18th, 2012 Michael Barr

In many ways, the story of my career as an embedded software developer is intertwined with the history of the magazine Embedded Systems Design. When it was launched in 1988, under the original title Embedded Systems Programming (ESP), I was finishing high school. Like the vast majority of people at that time, I had never heard the term “embedded system” or thought much about the computers hidden away inside other kinds of products. Six years later I was a degreed electrical engineer who, like many EEs by that time in the mid-90′s, had a job designing embedded software rather than hardware. Shortly thereafter I discovered the magazine on a colleague’s desk, and became a subscriber and devotee.

The Early Days

In the early 1990s, as now, the specialized knowledge needed to write reliable embedded software was mostly not taught in universities. The only class I’d had in programming was in FORTRAN; I’d taught myself to program in assembly and C through a pair of hands-on labs that were, in hindsight, my only formal education in writing embedded software. It was on the job and from the pages of the magazine, then, that I first learned the practical skills of writing device drivers, porting and using operating systems, meeting real-time deadlines, implementing finite state machines, the pros and cons of languages other than C and assembly, remote debugging and JTAG, and so much more.

In that era, my work as a firmware developer involved daily interactions with Intel hex files, device programmers, tubes of EPROMs with mangled pins, UV erasers, mere kilobytes of memory, 8- and 16-bit processors, in-circuit emulators, and ROM monitors. Databooks were actual books; collectively, they took up whole bookshelves. I wrote and compiled my firmware programs on an HP-UX workstation on my desk, but then had to go downstairs to a lab to burn the chips, insert them into the prototype board, and test and debug via an attached ICE. I remember that on one especially daunting project eight miles separated my compiler and device programmer from the only instance of the target hardware; a single red LED and a dusty oscilloscope were the extent of my debugging toolbox.

Like you I had the Internet at my desk in the mid-90s, but it did not yet provide much useful or relevant information to my work other than via certain FTP sites (does anyone else remember FTPing into sunsite.unc.edu? or Gopher?). The rest was mostly blinking headlines and dancing hamster; and Amazon was merely the world’s biggest river. There was not yet an Embedded.com or EETimes.com. To learn about software and hardware best practices, I pursued an MSEE and CS classes at night and traveled to the Embedded Systems Conferences.

At the time, I wasn’t aware of any books about embedded programming. And every book that I had found on C started with “Hello, World”, only went up in abstraction from there, and ended without ever once addressing peripheral control, interrupt service routines, interfacing to assembly language routines, and operating systems (real-time or other). For reasons I couldn’t explain years later when Jack Ganssle asked me, I had the gumption to think I could write that missing book for embedded C programmers, got a contract from O’Reilly, and did–ending, rather than starting, mine with “Hello, World” (via an RS-232 port).

In 1998, a series of at least three twists of fate spanning four years found me taking a seat next to an empty chair at the speaker’s lunch at an Embedded Systems Conference. The chair’s occupant turned out to be Lindsey Vereen, who was then well into his term as the second editor-in-chief of the magazine. In addition to the book, I’d written an article or two for ESP by that time and Lindsey had been impressed with my ability to explain technical nuances. When he told me that he was looking for someone to serve as a technical editor, I didn’t realize it was the first step towards my role in that position.

Future Trends

Becoming and then staying involved with the magazine, first as technical editor and later as editor-in-chief and contributing editor, has been a highlight of my professional life. I had been a huge fan of ESP and of its many great columnists and other contributors in its first decade. And now, looking back, I believe my work helped make it an even more valuable forum for the exchange of key design ideas, best practices, and industry learning in its second decade. And, though I understand the move away from print towards online publishing and advertising, I am nonetheless saddened to see the magazine come to an end.

Reflecting back on these days long past reminds me that a lot truly has changed about embedded software design. Assembly language is used far less frequently today; C and C++ much more. EPROMs with their device programmers and UV erasers have been supplanted by flash memory and bootloaders. Bus widths and memory sizes have increased dramatically. Expensive in-circuit emulators and ROM monitors have morphed into inexpensive JTAG debug ports. ROM-DOS has been replaced with whatever Microsoft is branding embedded Windows this year. And open-source Linux has done so well that it has limited the growth of the RTOS industry as a whole–and become a piece of technology we all want to master if only for our resumes.

So what does the future hold? What will the everyday experiences of embedded programmers be like in 2020, 2030, or 2040? I see three big trends that will affect us all over those timeframes, each of which has already begun to unfold.

Trend 1: Volumes Finally Shift to 32-bit CPUs

My first prediction is that inexpensive, low-power, highly-integrated microcontrollers–as best exemplified by today’s ARM Cortex-M family–will bring 32-bit CPUs into even the highest volume application domains. The volumes of 8- and 16-bit CPUs will finally decline as these parts become truly obsolete.

Though you may be programming for a 32-bit processor already, it’s still true that 8- and 16-bit processors still drive CPU chip sales volumes. I’m referring, of course, to microcontrollers such as those based on 8051, PIC, and other instruction set architectures dating back 30-40 years. These older architectures remain popular today only because certain low-margin, high-volume applications of embedded processing demand squeezing every penny out of BOM cost.

The limitations of 8- and 16-bit architectures impact the embedded programmers in a number of ways. First, there are the awkward memory limitations resulting from limited address bus widths–and the memory banks, segmenting techniques, and other workarounds to going beyond those limitations. Second, these CPUs are much better at decision making than mathematics–they lack the ability to manipulate large integers efficiently and have no floating-point capability. Finally, these older processors frequently lack modern development tools, are unable to run larger Internet-enabled operating systems, such as Linux, and don’t feature the security and reliabiltiy protections afforded by an MMU.

There will, of course, always be many applications that are extremely cost-conscious, so my prediction is not that they will disappear completely, but that the overall price (including BOM cost as well as power consumption) of 32-bit micro controllers, with their improved instruction set architectures and transistor geometries, will win on price. That will put the necessary amount of computing power into the hands of some designers and make our work easier for all of us. It also helps programmers accomplish more in less time.

Trend 2: Complexity Forces Programmers Beyond C

My second prediction is that the days of the C programming language’s dominance in embedded systems are numbered.

Don’t get me wrong, C is a language I know and love. But, as you may know firsthand, C is simply not up to the task of building systems requiring over a million lines of code. Nonetheless, the demanded complexity of embedded software has been driving our systems towards more than a million lines of code. At this level of complexity, something has to give.

Additionally, our industry is facing a crisis: the average age of an embedded developer is rapidly increasing and C is generally not taught in universities anymore. Thus, even as the demand for embedded intelligence in every industry continues to increase, the population of skilled and experienced C programmers is on the decline. Something has to give on this front too.

But what alternative language can be used to build real-time software, manipulate hardware directly, and be quickly ported to numerous instruction set architectures? It’s not going to be C++ or Ada or Java, for sure–as those have already been tried and found lacking. A new programming language is probably not the answer either, across so many CPU families and with so many other languages already tried.

Thus I predict that tools that are able to reliably generate those millions of lines of C code automatically for us, based on system specifications, will ultimately take over. As an example of a current tool of this sort that could be part of the trend, I direct your attention to Miro Samek’s dandy open source Quantum Platform (QP) framework for event-driven programs and his (optional) free Quantum Modeler (QM) graphical modeling tool. You may not like the idea of auto-generated code today, but I guarantee that once you push a button to generate consistent and correct code from an already expressive statechart diagram, you will see the benefits of the overall structure and be ready to move up a level in programming efficiency.

I view C as a reasonable common output language for such tools (given that C can manipulate hardware registers directly and that every processor ever invented has a C compiler). Note that I do expect there to be continued demand for those of us with the skills and interest to fine tune the performance of the generated code or write device drivers to integrate it more closely to the hardware.

Trend 3: Connectivity Drives Importance of Security

We’re increasingly connecting embedded systems–to each other and to the Internet. You’ve heard the hype (e.g., “Internet of things” and “ubiquitous computing”) and you’ve probably already also put TCP/IP into one or more of your designs. But connectivity has a lot of implications that we are only starting to come to terms with. The most obvious of these is security.

A connected device cannot hide for long behind “security through obscurity” and, so, we must design security into our connected devices from the start. In my travels around our industry I’ve observed that the majority of embedded designers are largely unfamiliar with security. Sure some of you have read about encryption algorithms and know the names of a few. But mostly the embedded community is shooting in the dark as security designers, within organizations that aren’t of much help. And security is only as strong as the weakest link in the chain.

This situation must change. Just as Flash memory has supplanted UV-erasable EPROM, so too will over-the-net patches and upgrades take center stage as a download mechanism in coming years and decades. We must architect our systems first to be secure and then to accepted trusted downloads so that our products can keep up in the inevitable arms race against hackers and attackers.

And That’s a Wrap

Whatever the future holds, I am certain that embedded software development will remain an engaging and challenging career. And you’ll still find me writing about the field at http://embeddedgurus.com/barr-code and http://twitter.com/embeddedbarr.

Building Reliable and Secure Embedded Systems

Tuesday, March 13th, 2012 Michael Barr

In this era of 140 characters or less, it has been well and concisely stated that, “RELIABILITY concerns ACCIDENTAL errors causing failures, whereas SECURITY concerns INTENTIONAL errors causing failures.” In this column I expand on this statement, especially as regards the design of embedded systems and their place in our network-connected and safety-concious modern world.

As the designers of embedded systems, the first thing we must accomplish on any project is to make the hardware and software work. That is to say we need to make the system behave as it was designed to. The first iteration of this is often flaky; certain uses or perturbations of the system by testers can easily dislodge the system into a non-working state. In common parlance, “expect bugs.”

Given time, tightening cycles of debug and test can get us past the bugs and through to a shippable product. But is a debugged system good enough? Neither reliability nor security can be tested into a product. Each must be designed in from the start. So let’s take a closer look at these two important design aspects for modern embedded systems and then I’ll bring them back together at the end.

Reliable Embedded Systems

A product can be stable yet lack reliability. Consider, for example, an anti-lock braking computer installed in a car. The software in the anti-lock brakes may be bug-free, but how does it function if a critical input sensor fails?

Reliable systems are robust in the face of adverse run-time environments. Reliable systems are able to work around errors encountered as they occur to the system in the field–so that the number and impact of failures are minimized. One key strategy for building reliable systems is to eliminate single-points-of-failure. For example, redundancy could be added around that critical input sensor–perhaps by adding a second sensor in parallel with the first.

Another aspect of reliability that is under the complete control of designers (at least when they consider it from the start) are the “fail-safe” mechanisms. Perhaps a suitable but lower-cost alternative to a redundant sensor is detection of the failed sensor with a fall back to mechanical braking.

Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is one of the most effective and important design processes used by engineers serious about designing reliability into their systems. Following this process, each possible failure point is traced from the root failure outward to its effects. In an FMEA, numerical weights can be applied to the likelihoods of each failure as well as the seriousness of consequences. An FMEA can thus help guide you to a cost effective but higher reliability design by highlighting the most valuable places to insert the redundancy, fail-safes, or other elements that reinforce the system’s overall reliability.

In certain industries, reliability is a key driver of product safety. And that is why you see these techniques and FMEA and other design for reliability processes being applied by the designers of safety-critical automotive, medical, avionics, nuclear, and industrial systems. The same techniques can, of course, be used to make any type of embedded system more reliable.

Regardless of your industry, it is typically difficult or impossible to make your product as reliable via patches. There’s no way to add hardware like that redundant sensor, so your options may reduce to a fail-safe that is helpful but less reliable overall. Reliability cannot be patched or tested or debugged into your system. Rather, reliability must be designed in from the start.

Secure Embedded Systems

A product can also be stable yet lack security. For example, an office printer is the kind of product most of us purchase and use without giving a minute of thought to security. The software in the printer may be bug-free, but is it able to prevent a would-be eavesdropper from capturing a remote electronic copy of everything you print, including your sensitive financial documents?

Secure systems are robust in the face of persistent attack. Secure systems are able to keep hackers out by design. One key strategy for building secure systems is to validate all inputs, especially those arriving over an open network connection. For example, security could be added to a printer by ensuring against buffer overflows and encrypting and digitally signing firmware updates.

One of the unfortunate facts of designing secure embedded systems is that the hackers who want to get in only need to find and exploit a single weakness. Adding layers of security is good, but if even any one of those layers remains fundamentally weak, a sufficiently motivated attacker will eventually find and breach that defense. But that’s not an excuse for not trying.

For years, the largest printer maker in the world apparently gave little thought to the security of the firmware in its home/office printers, even as it was putting tens of millions of tempting targets out into the world. Now the security of those printers has been breached by security researchers with a reasonable awareness of embedded systems design. Said one of the lead researchers, “We can actually modify the firmware of the printer as part of a legitimate document. It renders correctly, and at the end of the job there’s a firmware update. … In a super-secure environment where there’s a firewall and no access — the government, Wall Street — you could send a résumé to print out.”

Security is a brave new world for many embedded systems designers. For decades we have relied on the fact that the microcontrollers and Flash memory and real-time operating systems and other less mainstream technologies we use will protect our products from attack. Or that we can gain enough “security by obscurity” by keeping our communications protocols and firmware upgrade processes secret. But we no longer live in that world. You must adapt.

Consider the implications of an insecure design of an automotive safety system that is connected to another Internet-connected computer in the car via CAN; or the insecure design of an implanted medical device; or the insecure design of your product.

Too often, the ability to upgrade a product’s firmware in the field is the very vector that’s used to attack. This can happen even when a primary purpose for including remote firmware updates is motivated by security. For example, as I’ve learned in my work as an expert witness in numerous cases involving reverse engineering of the techniques and technology of satellite television piracy, much of that piracy has been empowered by the same software patching mechanism that allowed the broadcasters to perform security upgrades and electronic countermeasures. Ironically, had the security smart cards in those set-top boxes had only masked ROM images the overall system security may have been higher. This was certainly not what the designers of the system had in mind. But security is also an arms race.

Like reliability, security must be designed in from the start. Security can’t be patched or tested or debugged in. You simply can’t add security as effectively once the product ships. For example, an attacker who wished to exploit a current weakness in your office printer or smart card might download his hack software into your device and write-protect his sectors of the flash today so that his code could remain resident even as you applied security patches.

Reliable and Secure Embedded Systems

It is important to note at this point that reliable systems are inherently more secure. And that, vice versa, secure systems are inherently more reliable. So, although, design for reliability and design for security will often individually yield different results–there is also an overlap between them.

An investment in reliability, for example, generally pays off in security. Why? Well, because a more reliable system is more robust in its handling of all errors, whether they are accidental or intentional. An anti-lock braking system with a fall back to mechanical braking for increased reliability is also more secure against an attack against that critical hardware input sensor. Similarly, those printers wouldn’t be at risk of fuser-induced fire in the case of a security breach if they were never at risk of fire in the case of any misbehavior of the software.

Consider, importantly, that one of the first things a hacker intent on breaching the security of your embedded device might do is to perform a (mental, at least) fault tree analysis of your system. This attacker would then target her time, talents, and other resources at one or more single points of failure she considers most likely to fail in a useful way.

Because a fault tree analysis starts from the general goal and works inward deductively toward the identification of one or more choke points that might produce the desired erroneous outcome, attention paid to increasing reliability such as via FMEA usually reduces choke points and makes the attacker’s job considerably more difficult. Where security can break down even in a reliable system is where the possibility of an attacker’s intentionally induced failure is ignored in the FMEA weighting and thus possible layers of protection are omitted.

Similarly, an investment in security may pay off in greater reliability–even without a directed focus on reliability. For example, if you secure your firmware upgrade process to accept only encrypted and digitally signed binary images you’ll be adding a layer of protection against an inadvertently corrupted binary causing an accidental error and product failure. Anything you do to improve the security of communications (i.e., checksums, prevention of buffer overflows, etc.) can have a similar effect on reliability.

The Only Way Forward

Each year it becomes increasingly important for all of us in the embedded systems design community to learn to design reliable and secure products. If you don’t, it might be your product making the wrong kind of headlines and your source code and design documents being poured over by lawyers. It is no longer acceptable to stick your head in the sand on these issues.

Combining C’s volatile and const Keywords

Tuesday, January 24th, 2012 Michael Barr

Does it ever make sense to declare a variable in C or C++ as both volatile (i.e., “ever-changing”) and const (“read-only”)? If so, why? And how should you combine volatile and const properly?

One of the most consistently popular articles on the Netrino website is about C’s volatile keyword. The volatile keyword, like const, is a type qualifier. These keywords can be used by themselves or together in variable declarations.

I’ve written about volatile and const individually before. If you haven’t previously used the volatile keyword, I recommend you read How to Use C’s volatile Keyword before going on. As that article makes plain:

C’s volatile keyword is a qualifier that is applied to a variable when it is declared. It tells the compiler that the value of the variable may change at any time–without any action being taken by the code the compiler finds nearby.

How to Use C’s volatile Keyword

By declaring a variable volatile you are effectively asking the compiler to be as inefficient as possible when it comes to reading or writing that variable. Specifically, the compiler should generate object code to perform each and every read from a volatile variable and each and every write to a volatile variable–even if you write it twice in a row or read it and ignore the result. No read or write can be skipped. Effectively no optimizations are allowed with respect to volatile variables.

The use of volatile variables also creates additional sequence points in C and C++ programs. The order of accesses of volatile variables A and B in the object code must be the same as the order of those accesses in the source code. The compiler is not allowed to reorder volatile variable accesses for any reason.

Here are a couple of examples of declarations of volatile variables:

int volatile g_flag_shared_with_isr;

uint8_t volatile * p_led_reg = (uint8_t *) 0x00080000;

The first example declares a global flag that can be shared between an ISR and some other part of the code (e.g., a background processing loop in main() or an RTOS task) without fear that the compiler will optimize (i.e., “delete”) the code you write to check for asynchronous changes to the flag’s value. It is important to use volatile to declare all variables that are shared by asynchronous software entities, which is important in any kind of multithreaded programming. (Remember, though, that access to global variables shared by tasks or with an ISR must always also be controlled via a mutex or interrupt disable, respectively.)

The second example declares a pointer to a hardware register at a known physical memory address (80000h)–in this case to manipulate the state of one or more LEDs. Because the pointer to the hardware register is declared volatile, the compiler must always perform each individual write. Even if you write C code to turn an LED on followed immediately by code to turn the same LED off, you can trust that the hardware really will receive both instructions. Because of the sequence point restrictions, you are also guaranteed that the LED will be off after both lines of the C code have been executed. The volatile keyword should always be used with creating pointers to memory-mapped I/O such as this.

[See Coding Standard Rule #4: Use volatile Whenever Possible for more on the use of volatile by itself.]

How to Use C’s const Keyword

The const keyword is can be used to modify parameters as well as in variable declarations. Here we are only interested in the use of const as a type qualifier, as in:

uint16_t const max_temp_in_c = 1000;

This declaration creates a 16-bit unsigned integer value of 1,000 with a scoped name of max_temp_in_c. In C, this variable will exist in memory at run-time, but will typically be located, by the linker, in a non-volatile memory area such as ROM or flash. Any reference to the const variable will read from that location. (In C++, a const integer may no longer exist as an addressable location in run-time memory.)

Any attempt the code makes to write to a const variable directly (i.e., by its name) will result in a compile-time error. To the extent that the const variable is located in ROM or flash, an indirect write (i.e., via a pointer to its address) will also be thwarted–though at run-time, obviously.

Another use of const is to mark a hardware register as read-only. For example:

uint8_t const * p_latch_reg = 0x10000000;

Declaring the pointer this way, any attempt to write to that physical memory address via the pointer (e.g., *p_latch_reg = 0xFF;) should result in a compile-time error.

[See Coding Standard Rule #2: Use const Whenever Possible for more on the use of const by itself.]

How to Use const and volatile Together

Though the essence of the volatile (“ever-changing”) and const (“read-only”) decorators may seem at first glance opposed, there are some times when it makes sense to use them both to declare one variable. The scenarios I’ve run across have involved pointers to memory-mapped hardware registers and shared memory areas.

(#1) Constant Addresses of Hardware Registers

The following declaration uses both const and volatile in the frequently useful scenario of declaring a constant pointer to a volatile hardware register.

uint8_t volatile * const p_led_reg = (uint8_t *) 0x00080000;

The proper way to read a complex declaration like this is from the name of the variable back to the left, as in:

p_led_reg IS A constant pointer TO A volatile 8-bit unsigned integer.

Reading it that way, we can see that the keyword const modifies only the pointer (i.e., the fixed address 80000h), which does not change at run-time. Whereas the keyword volatile modifies only the type of integer. This is actually quite useful and is a much safer version of the declaration of a p_led_reg that appears at the top of this article. In particular, adding const means that the simple typo of a missed pointer dereference (‘*’) will be caught at compile time. That is, the mistaken code p_led_reg = LED1_ON; won’t overwrite the address with the non-80000h value of LED1_ON. The compiler error leads us to correct this to *p_led_reg = LED1_ON;, which is almost certainly what we meant to write in the first place.

(#2) Read-Only Shared-Memory Buffer

Another use for a combination of const and volatile is where you have two processors communicating via a shared memory area and you are coding the side of this communications that will only be reading from a shared memory buffer. In this case you could declare variables such as:

int const volatile comm_flag;

uint8_t const volatile comm_buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];

Of course, you’d usually want to instruct the linker to place these global variables at the correct addresses in the shared memory area or to declare the above as pointers to specific physical memory addresses. In the case of pointers, the use of const and volatile may become even more complex, as in the next category.

(#3) Read-Only Hardware Register

Sometimes you will run across a read-only hardware register. In addition to enforcing compile-time checking so that the software doesn’t try to overwrite the memory location, you also need to be sure that each and every requested read actually occurs. By declaring your variable IS A (constant) pointer TO A constant and volatile memory location you request all of the appropriate protections, as in:

uint8_t const volatile * const p_latch_reg = (uint8_t *) 0x10000000;

As you can see, the declarations of variables that involve both the volatile and const decorators can quickly become complicated to read. But the technique of combining C’s volatile and const keywords can be useful and even important. This is definitely something you should learn to master to be a master embedded software engineer.

Firmware Forensics: Best Practices in Embedded Software Source Code Discovery

Tuesday, September 27th, 2011 Michael Barr

Software has become ubiquitous, embedded as it is into the fabric of our lives in literally billions of new (non-computer) products per year, from microwave ovens to electronic throttle controls. When products controlled by software are the subject of litigation, whether for infringement of intellectual property rights or product liability, it is imperative to analyze the embedded software (a.k.a., firmware) properly and thoroughly. This article enumerates five best practices for embedded software source code discovery and the rationale for each.

In February 2011, the U.S. government’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and a team from NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center published reports of their joint investigation into the causes of unintended acceleration in Toyota vehicles. While NHTSA led the overall effort and examined recall records, accident reports, and complaint statistics, the more technically focused team from NASA performed reviews of the electronics and embedded software at the heart of Toyota’s “electronic throttle control subsystem” (ETCS). Redacted public versions of the official reports from each agency, together with a number of related documents, can be found at http://www.nhtsa.gov/UA.

These reports are very interesting in what they have to say about the quality of Toyota’s firmware and NASA’s review of the same. However, of greater significance is what they are not able to say about unintended acceleration. It appears that NASA did not follow a number of best practices for reviewing embedded software source code that might have identified useful evidence. In brief, NASA failed to find a firmware cause of unintended acceleration—but their review also fails to rule out firmware causes entirely.

This article describes a set of five recommended practices for firmware source code review that are based on my experiences as both an embedded software developer and as an expert witness. Each of the recommendations will consider what more could have been done to determine whether Toyota’s ETCS firmware played a role in any of the unintended acceleration. The five recommended practices are: (1) ask for the bug list; (2) insist on an executable; (3) reproduce the development environment; (4) try for the version control repository; and (5) remember the hardware. The relative value and importance of the individual practices will vary by type of litigation, so the recommendations are presented in the order that is most readable.

Ask for the Bug List

Any serious litigation involving embedded software will require an expert review of the source code. The source code should be requested early in the process of discovery. Owners of source code tend to strenuously resist such requests but procedures limiting access to the source code to only certain named and pre-approved experts and only under physical security (often a non-networked computer with no removable storage in a locked room) tend to be agreed upon or ordered by a judge.

Software development organizations commonly keep additional records that may prove more important or useful than a mere copy of the source code. Any reasonably thorough software team will maintain a bug list (a.k.a., defect database) describing most or all of the problems observed in the software along with the current status of each (e.g., “fixed in v2.2” or “still under investigation”). The list of bugs fixed and known—or the company’s lack of such a list—is germane to issues of software quality. Thus the bug list should be routinely requested and supplied in discovery. (It is also recommended that a request be made for copies of software design documents, coding standards, build logs and associated tool outputs, testing logs, and other artifacts of the embedded software design and development process.)

Very nearly every piece of software ever written has defects, both known and unknown. Thus the bug list provides helpful guidance to a reviewer of the source code. Often, for example, bugs cluster in specific source files in need of major rework. To ignore the company’s own records of known bugs, as the NASA reviewers apparently did, is to examine a constitution without considering the historical reasons for the adoption of each section and amendment. Indeed, a simple search of the text in Toyota’s bug list for the terms “stuck” and “fuel valve” might yet provide some useful information about unintended acceleration.

Insist on an Executable

In software parlance, the “executable” program is the binary version of the program that’s actually executed in the product. The machine-readable executable is constructed from a set of human-readable source code files using software build tools such as compilers and linkers. It is important to recognize that one set of source code files may be capable of producing multiple executables, based on tool configuration and options.

Though not human-readable, an executable program may provide valuable information to an expert reviewer. For example, one common technique is to extract the human-readable “strings” within the executable. The strings in an executable program include information such as on-screen messages to the user (e.g., “Press the ‘?’ button for help.”). In a copyright infringement case in which I once consulted several strings in the defendant’s executable helpfully contained a phrase similar to “Copyright Plaintiff”! You may not be so lucky, but isn’t it worth a try?

It may also be possible to reverse engineer or disassemble an executable file into a more human-readable form. Disassembly could be important in cases of alleged patent infringement, for example, where what looks like an infringement of a method claim in the source code might be unused code or not actually part of the executable in the product as used by customers.

Sometimes it is easy to extract the executable directly from the product for expert examination—in which case the expert should engage in this step. For instance, software running on Microsoft Windows consists of an executable file with the extension .EXE, which is easily extracted. However, the executable programs in most embedded systems are difficult, at best, to extract. (Note that if it is possible for the expert to extract an executable from one or more exemplars of the product, an automated comparison should always be made between the installed and produced binary files. You never know what you may find and any difference could have important implications for the facts underlying the case.) Extraction of Toyota’s ETCS firmware might not be physically possible. Thus the legal team should insist on production of the executable(s) actually used by the relevant customers.

Reproduce the Development Environment

The dichotomy between source code and executable code and the inability of even most software experts to make much sense of binary code can create problems in the factual landscape of litigation. For example, suppose that the source code produced by Toyota was inadvertently incomplete in that it was missing two or three source code files. Even an expert reviewer looking at the source code might not know about the absent files. For example, if the bug the expert is looking for is related to fuel valve control and the code related to that subject doesn’t reference the missing files, the reviewer may not notice their absence. No expert can spot a bug in a missing file.

Fortunately, there is a reliable way for an expert to confirm that she has been provided with all of the source code. The objective is simply stated: reproduce the software build tools setup and compile the produced source code. To do this it is necessary to have a copy of the development team’s detailed build settings, such as make files, preprocessor defines, and linker control files. If the build process completes and produces an executable, it is certain the other party has provided a complete copy of the source code. (Further additional technical details include the need to start with a “clean” set of files that contains no object files or libraries. It may also be necessary to obtain third-party header files or libraries.)

Furthermore, if the executable as built matches the executable as produced (actually, ideally, the executable as extracted from the product) bit by binary bit, it is certain that the other party has provided a true and correct version of the source code. Unfortunately, trying to prove this part may take longer than just completing a build; the build could fail to produce the desired proof for a variety of reasons. The details here get complicated: to get exactly the same output executable, it is necessary to use all of the following: precisely the same version of the compiler, linker, and each other build tool as the original developers; precisely the same configuration of each of those tools; and precisely the same set of build instructions. Even a slight variation in just one of these details will generally produce an executable that doesn’t match the other binary image at all—just as the wrong version of the source code would.

Try for the Version Control Repository

Embedded software source code is never created in an instant. All software is developed one layer at a time over a period of months or years in the same way that a bridge and the attached roadways exist in numerous interim configurations during their construction. The version control repository for a software program is like a series of time-lapse photos tracking the day-by-day changes in the construction of the bridge. But there is one considerable difference: it is possible to go back to one of those source code snapshots and rebuild the executable of that particular version. This becomes critically important when multiple software versions will be deployed over a number of years. In the automotive industry, for example, it must be possible to give one customer a bug fix for his v2.1 firmware while also working on the new v3.0 firmware to be released the following model year.

Consider, for the sake of discussion, that the executable version of Toyota’s ETCS v2.1 firmware that was installed in the factory in one million cars around the world had an undiscovered bug that could result in unintended acceleration under certain rare operating conditions. Now further suppose that this bug was (perhaps unintentionally) eliminated in the v2.2 source code, from which a subsequent executable was created and installed at the factory into millions more cars with the same model names—and also as an upgrade into some of the original one million cars as they visited dealers for scheduled maintenance. In this scenario, an examination of the v2.2 source code proves nothing about the safety of the hundreds of thousands of cars still with v2.1 under the hood.

Gaining access to the entire version control repository containing all of the past versions of a company’s firmware source code through discovery may be out of the question. For example, a judge in a source code copyright and trade secrets case I consulted in would only allow the plaintiff to choose one calendar date and to then receive a snapshot of the defendant’s source code from that specific date. If the plaintiff was lucky it would find evidence of their proprietary code in that specific snapshot. But the observed absence of their proprietary code from that one specific snapshot doesn’t prove the alleged theft didn’t happen earlier or later in time.

There are some problems with examination of an entire version control repository. It may be difficult to make sense of the repository’s structure. Or, if the structure can be understood, it might take many times as long to perform a thorough review of the major and minor versions of the various source code files as it would to just review one snapshot in time. At first glance, many of those files would appear the same or similar in every version—but subtle differences could be important to making a case. To really be productive with that volume of code, it may be necessary to obtain a chronological schedule provided by a bug list and/or other production documents describing the source code at various points in time.

Remember the Hardware

Embedded software is always written with the hardware platform in mind and should be reviewed in the same manner. For example, it is only possible to properly reverse engineer or disassemble an executable program once the specific microprocessor (e.g., Pentium, PowerPC, or ARM) is known. But knowing the processor is just the beginning, because the hardware and software are intertwined in complex ways in such embedded systems.

Only one or more features of the hardware are enabled or active when the hardware is in a particular configuration. For instance, consider an embedded system with a network interface, such as an Ethernet jack that is only powered when a cable is mechanically inserted. Some or all of the software required to send and receive messages over this network may be not be executed until a cable is inserted. A proper analysis of the software needs to keep hardware-software interactions like this in perspective. Ideally, testing of the firmware should be done on the hardware as configured in exemplars of the units at issue—so it is useful to ask for hardware during discovery, if you are not able to acquire exemplars in other ways. It is not clear from the redacted reports if NHTSA’s testing of certain Toyota Camrys was done using the same firmware version on exactly the same hardware as the owners who experienced unintended acceleration. Hardware interactions can be one of the most important considerations of all when analyzing embedded software.

Sometimes a bug is not visible in the software itself. Such a bug may result from a combination of hardware and software behaviors or multi-processor interactions. For example, one motor control system I’m familiar with had a dangerous race condition. The bug, though, was the result of an unforeseen mismatch between the hardware reaction time and the software reaction time around a sequence of commands to the motor.

Additional Analysis Required

As you can see, the review of embedded software can be complicated. This is partly because the hardware of each embedded system is unique. In addition, the system as a whole generally involves complex interactions between hardware, software, and user. An expert in embedded software should typically have a degree in electrical engineering, computer engineering, or computer science plus years of relevant experience designing embedded systems and programming in the relevant language(s).

The five best practices presented here are meant to establish the critical importance of making certain specific requests early in the legal discovery process. They are by no means the only types of analysis that should be performed on the source code. For example, in any case involving the quality or reliability of embedded software, the source code should be tested via static analysis tools. This and other types of technical analysis should be well understood by any expert witness or litigation consultant with the proper background.

In the case of Toyota’s unintended acceleration issues, I hope that expert review in the class action litigation against Toyota will include these and other additional types of analysis to identify all of the potential causes and determine if embedded software played any role. Though government funds for analysis by NASA are understandably limited, it is suggested that transportation safety organizations, such as NHTSA, should establish rules that ensure that future investigations are more thorough and that safety-related technical findings in litigation cannot be hidden behind the veil of secrecy of a settlement agreement.

Don’t Follow These 5 Dangerous Coding Standard Rules

Tuesday, August 30th, 2011 Michael Barr

Over the summer I happened across a brief blog post by another firmware developer in which he presented ten C coding rules for better embedded C code. I had an immediate strong negative reaction to half of his rules and later came to dislike a few more, so I’m going to describe what I don’t like about each. I’ll refer to this author as BadAdvice. I hope that if you have followed rules like the five below my comments will persuade you to move away from those toward a set of embedded C coding rules that keep bugs out. If you disagree, please start a constructive discussion in the comments.

Bad Rule #1: Do not divide; use right shift.

As worded, the above rule is way too broad. It’s not possible to always avoid C’s division operator. First of all, right shifting only works as a substitute for division when it is integer division and the denominator is a power of two (e.g., right shift by one bit to divide by 2, two bits to divide by 4, etc.). But I’ll give BadAdvice the benefit of the doubt and assume that he meant to say you should “use right shift as a substitute for division whenever possible”.

For his example, BadAdvice shows code to compute an average over 16 integer data samples, which are accumulated into a variable sum, during the first 16 iterations of a loop. On the 17th iteration, the average is computed by right shifting sum by 4 bits (i.e., dividing by 16). Perhaps the worst thing about this example code is how much it is tied a pair of #defines for the magic numbers 16 and 4. A simple but likely refactoring to average over 15 instead of 16 samples would break the entire example–you’d have to change from the right shift to a divide proper. It’s also easy to imagine someone changing AVG_COUNT from 16 to 15 without realizing about the shift; and if you didn’t change this, you’d get a bug in that the sum of 15 samples would still be right shifted by 4 bits.

Better Rule: Shift bits when you mean to shift bits and divide when you mean to divide.

There are many sources of bugs in software programs. The original programmer creates some bugs. Other bugs result from misunderstandings by those who later maintain, extend, port, and/or reuse the code. Thus coding rules should emphasize readability and portability most highly. The choice to deviate from a good coding rule in favor of efficiency should be taken only within a subset of the code. Unless there is a very specific function or construct that needs to be hand optimized, efficiency concerns should be left to the compiler.

Bad Rule #2: Use variable types in relation to the maximum value that variable may take.

BadAdvice gives the example of a variable named seconds, which holds integer values from 0 to 59. And he shows choosing char for the type over int. His stated goal is to reduce memory use.

In principle, I agree with the underlying practices of not always declaring variables int and choosing the type (and signedness) based on the maximum range of values. However, I think it essential that any practice like this be matched with a corresponding practice of always declaring specifically sized variables using C99′s portable fixed-width integer types.

It is impossible to understand the reasoning of the original programmer from unsigned char seconds;. Did he choose char because it is big enough or for some other reason? (Remember too that a plain char may be naturally signed or unsigned, depending on the compiler. Perhaps the original programmer even knows his compiler’s chars are default unsigned and omits that keyword.) The intent behind variables declared short and long is at least as difficult to decipher. A short integer may be 16-bits or 32-bits (or something else), depending on the compiler; a width the original programmer may have (or may not have) relied upon.

Better Rule: Whenever the width of an integer matters, use C99′s portable fixed-width integer types.

A variable declared uint16_t leaves no doubt about the original intent as it is very clearly meant to be a container for an unsigned integer value no wider than 16-bits. This type selection adds new and useful information to the source code and makes programs both more readable and more portable. Now that C99 has standardized the names of fixed-width integer types, declarations involving short and long should no longer be used. Even char should only be used for actual character (i.e., ASCII) data. (Of course, there may still be int variables around, where size does not matter, such as in loop counters.)

Bad Rule #3: Avoid >= and use <.

As worded above, I can’t say I understand this rule or its goal sufficiently, but to illustrate it BadAdvice gives the specific example of an if-else if wherein he recommends if (speed < 100) ... else if (speed > 99) instead of if (speed < 100) ... else if (speed >= 100). Say what? First of all, why not just use else for that specific scenario, as speed must be either below 100 or 100 or above.

Even if we assume we need to test for less than 100 first and then for greater than or equal to 100 second, why would anyone in their right mind prefer to use greater than 99? That would be confusing to any reader of the code. To me it reads like a bug and I need to keep going back over it to find the logical problem with the apparently mismatched range checks. Additionally, I believe that BadAdvice’s terse rationale that “Benefits: Lesser Code” is simply untrue. Any half decent compiler should be able to optimize either comparison as needed for the underlying processor.

Better Rule: Use whatever comparison operator is easiest to read in a given situation.

One of the very best things any embedded programmer can do is to make their code as readable as possible to as broad an audience as possible. That way another programmer who needs to modify your code, a peer doing code review to help you find bugs, or even you years later, will find the code hard to misinterpret.

Bad Rule #4: Avoid variable initialization while defining.

BadAdvice says that following the above rule will make initialization faster. He gives the example of unsigned char MyVariable = 100; (not preferred) vs:


#define INITIAL_VALUE 100
unsigned char MyVariable;
// Before entering forever loop in main
MyVariable = INITIAL_VALUE

Though it’s unclear from the above, let’s assume that MyVariable is a local stack variable. (It could also be global, the way his pseudo code is written.) I don’t think there should be a (portably) noticeable efficiency gain from switching to the latter. And I do think that following this rule creates an opening to forget to do the initialization or to unintentionally place the initialization code within a conditional clause.

Better Rule: Initialize every variable as soon as you know the initial value.

I’d much rather see every variable initialized on creation with perhaps the creation of the variable postponed as long as possible. If you’re using a C99 or C++ compiler, you can declare a variable anywhere within the body of a function.

Bad Rule #5: Use #defines for constant numbers.

The example given for this rule is of defining three constant values, including #define ON 1 and #define OFF 0. The rationale is “Increased convenience of changing values in a single place for the whole file. Provides structure to the code.” And I agree that using named constants instead of magic numbers elsewhere in the code is a valuable practice. However, I think there is an even better way to go about this.

Better Rule: Declare constants using const or enum.

C’s const keyword can be used to declare a variable of any type as unable to be changed at run-time. This is a preferable way of declaring constants, as they are in this way given a type that can be used to make comparisons properly and enabling them to be type-checked by the compiler if they are passed as parameters to function calls. Enumeration sets may be used instead for integer constants that come in groups, such as enum { OFF = 0, ON };.

Final Thoughts

There are two scary things about these and a few of the other rules on BadAdvice’s blog. First, is that they are out there on the Internet to be found with a search for embedded C coding rules. Second, is that BadAdvice’s bio says he works on medical device design. I’m not sure which is worse. But I do hope the above reasoning and proposed better rules gets you thinking about how to develop more reliable embedded software with fewer bugs.